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I. INTRODUCTION

In an age of accelerating microprocessors and diminished attention spans,
simple boredom with Washington politics-as-usual has made the selling pitch
of "new & improved" as effective for political agendas as for laundry soap.
Political unrest increasingly replaces the Republican and Democratic parties as
the controlling influence in determining the composition of the federal
government. 2 The half-life of political support seems to be halving from
Reagan's two terms, to Bush's single term, to Clinton's two year approval
3
rating slide, to Gingrich's plummet in the polls after only one year as speaker.
What seems to work best-at least for a while-are catchy phrases and patriotic
symbols: "Three strikes and you're out," "Contract with America," and
"Balanced Budget." Perhaps it is inevitable that tinkering with the Constitution
will fire the public's imagination; especially with images of burning the
American flag or promises of a balanced budget. Recent congressional votes
show that we have come very close to proposed amendments constraining
federal power over the budget and citizens' expressive freedom. 4 Catchy

2

See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, PresidentQuayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913
(1992).
3
Cf. Richard L. Berke, Clinton's Ratings Over 50% in Poll As G.O.P Declines, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at Al, A17 (discussing President Clinton's approval ratings slide
over two years and recent polls showing Speaker Gingrich's approval rating decline).
4
Since 1989, the number of senators voting in favor of a flag-burning amendment
has been steadily rising to require only three more "yes" votes to meet the constitutional
requirement of two-thirds of both houses of Congress. Robin Toner, Flag-Burning
Amendment FailsIn Senate, but Margin Narrows: ProposedConstitutional Change is 3 Votes
Short, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1995, at Al, A14. Similarly, the balanced-budget amendment
was only four votes short in the Senate of the constitutional requirement. Richardson
Powelson, Matthews: White House not Behind My Budget Vote, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL,
Mar. 4, 1994, at A15.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss3/5
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gimmicks seem to bolster chances of reelection more than sound policy
5
reasoning.
Momentary inclinations of the electorate and sound bites are ill suited for
determining whether the Bill of Rights should be abridged for the first time or
whether Article I's allocation of legislative power needs to be reigned in.6
Exactly this would result if amending the Constitution were subject to national
elections, instead of the congressional and state super majorities required by
Article V. Nonetheless, Professor Akhil Amar has defended the idea that
7
Americans may amend the Constitution regardless of Article V's dictates.
Professor Amar does not stand alone on this claim. Professor Bruce Ackerman
not only agrees, but would actually prefer direct popular amendment over the
express Article V procedures. 8 Their arguments, however, ignore the Framers'
careful balancing of federal and popular principles in Article V by embracing
only the democratic populist aspect of the Constitution.
The Framers did recognize that democracy offers an essential means of
ensuring that its citizens enjoy political freedom. Thus, the constitutional
scheme preserves democratic institutions during its operation, and during its
amendment. Each of Article V's two amendment procedures includes a
democratic element by involving state legislatures or conventions either to
ratify a proposed amendment or to call for a constitutional convention for
purposes of proposing an amendment. 9 To the Framers, state legislatures and

5
The ephemeral nature of amendment politics showed in the vote on the
balanced-budget amendment when all five of the senators who switched from an earlier
"no" to "yes" votes faced reelection the next year. Mark Z. Barabak, Balanced-budget
About-face Leaves FeinsteinCredibility Insecure, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 4, 1995,
at A3. Note, however, that "[o]f the six senators who switched from "yes" to "no," thus
sealing the amendment's defeat, none face re-election sooner than 1998, by which time
[the March 1995] vote may well be politically irrelevant." Id. Even if voters remember,
a vote either way can be justified because "voter support for a balanced budget-80
percent in the abstract-plummets to the 30 percent range when Social Security is
threatened." Id.
6
Note that concerted efforts are also being made to revise the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of citizenship to those born in the United States and the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. See Neil A. Lewis, Bill Seeks to End Citizenship As
Birthrightfor Everyone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A20 (noting "substantial initial
support" of congressional representatives for eliminating automatic citizenship for
those born in United States); J. Michael Parker, Conservative ChristiansBack 2 Amendment
Ideas, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 2, 1995, at Al (noting congressional and
grass-roots support for "Religious Equality Amendment" and "Religious Liberties
Amendment").
7

See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent].
8

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOuNDATIONS 54 (1991); Bruce Ackerman,

Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
9

See infra Part III.B.
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conventions represented self-governance at the most local level possible. 10 The
Framers, however, also understood that the democratic principle must be
balanced against another principle-the principle of federalism. Otherwise, the
majority might constitute a tyranny by denying individuals or even a sizable
minority of their rights. 11 Not surprisingly, Article V's amendment procedures
contain a blend of federal and democratic components that the Framers
anticipated would further Preamble aims.
Article V's federal aspect inheres in Congress's role in proposing
amendments or convening a convention to propose an amendment. In
originating amendments, Congress serves as the single, deliberate body best
able to suggest improvements to the constitutional system. 12 Or, Congress

10

See James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal in the Pennsylvania Ratifying

Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE
ANTIFEDERALIST

SPEECHES,

ARTICLES,

DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND
AND LETrERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER

RATIFICATION 846, 850 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (arguing that most direct election

procedures possible at time were incorporated into the Constitution, and that these

included action by states, the electoral college, and conventions) [hereinafter DEBATE].
But see infra text accompanying notes 187-88 (noting recent arguments that this filter of
representation no longer is necessary due to improved transportation and
communicative technologies).
11

For example, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause allows governmental takings
of private property for the public good, but requires the public to make the owner whole
again through "justcompensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). This clause
demonstrates the understanding that the minority may be denied political or economic
victory but not justice. Professor Amar emphasizes the majoritarian and states rights
aspects of the Bill of Rights, but perhaps with too much zeal. He dismisses the Takings
Clause as nothing more than a provision that Madison had the foresight to "sneak in."
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE. L.J. 1131, 1181-82
(1991) ("How, then, did [Madison] manage to slip the Takings Clause through? In part
by clever bundling, tying the clause to a variety of other provisions that commanded
more enthusiasm....") [hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights]. Amar's account of the takings
clause passage characterizes Madison's drafting as involving a "log-rolling" tactic only
with respect to the Fifth Amendment.
Surely, we must give Madison and his colleagues more credit. Elsewhere, Professor
Amar acknowledges the care given to the preparation of our governing document. See
Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution:A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281,
287 (1987) (noting that first Congress in 1789 concerned itself with printing "correct"
copy of Constitution to clean up "de minimus" textual discrepancies). Thus, it seems
surprising that Professor Amar dismisses a focus on "just" treatment of an individual or
minority suffering (economic) deprivation. While the Framers did focus on the
majoritarian aspect of government, their goals as stated in the Preamble-to establish a
more perfect union and justice-compelled them to safeguard the minority as well as
well as affirm majoritarian rights.
Thus, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not address the collective people or
states, but use the singular in requiring that "no person" shall be denied the benefit of
counsel or the due process. Although these protections prevent the government from
waging a divide and conquer battle against the majority, their language focuses on
individual and minority protections that "no person" may be denied. U.S. CONST.
amends. V & VI.
12

See 2 THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 558 (1987) (Max Farrand
ed., Rev. Ed. 1966) (recounting Hamilton's argument that "[t]he National Legislature

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss3/5
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should ensure that the convention be properly composed and convened in a
proper setting. 13 Underlying the Framers' involvement of Congress was the
intent that it would ensure that only one version of a proposed amendment
pending ratification while an impetus for change may find support in many
quarters. 14 Thus, democracy is tempered against excess by being balanced
against federalism.
Federal principles may appear to disempower the political agency of the
electorate in this juxtaposition. But federalism serves not to disempower, but
to temper the tyranny of the majority. 15 This is not a government in which the
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. 16 Federalism
guarantees "to our posterity" 17 the longevity and vitality of our system. Thus,
it complements the self-governance principle of republican government. Proerly conceived, federalism does not trump democracy. 18 Instead, the true role
of federalism is to defend against innovations, inclinations, and confusion that

will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of amendments
.... ) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS].
13

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL STUDY: THE CONVENTION METHOD FOR

AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1974) (concluding that Congress should provide for
time, place, composition, and financing of constitutional convention) [hereinafter ABA
STUDY]; PAUL J. WEBER & BARBARA A. PERRY, UNFOUNDED FEARS: MYTHS AND REALITIES

OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 145-52 (1989) (reprinting bill introduced to Senate to
codify procedures for Congress to follow, which include convening convention,
administering oath to delegates, financing, and provision of information and
assistance).
14

See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also infra note 181 and accompanying text.
15
See infra Part I.B.3 (examining what tempers tyranny of the majority under our
Constitution).
16

Cf. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 331 (Crawley trans., Modem Lib. Ed.
1951) (recounting Athenian's rejection of Melian entreaties for justice because "right, as
the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must"). In contrast, ours is a government of All
of Us the People of the United States, not just the half plus one.
17 U.S. CONST. preamble.
18

This is not to say that democracy has never been undermined; it has been on a
number of occasions. Federalism, however, has not been the source of subordination of
democracy. Those sources have found their roots elsewhere-in prejudice, economic
forces, and efficiency rationales.
Most tragically, the aims of republican government, as declared by the Declaration
of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution, were denied to slaves and those
suffering involuntary servitude. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Article I, section 3 denied
autochthonous Americans and slaves from even being counted as complete persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Thus, it followed that they did not count enough to merit
complete rights. Essentially, slaves' economic value-to a select few-precluded
recognition of their value as political participants in the nation they helped support.
Consider the following account of statement by George Mason, Virginia delegate to the
Philadelphia convention:

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
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would irreparably or perniciously undermine majoritarian action. Federalism
is that principle-the lack of which doomed many of the ancient republics to
tempestuous and short lives-that ensures the federal government's role in
safeguarding democracy.19 The irony of direct democracy is that a majority can
hold inclinations that are anti-majoritarian and act on these in a majoritarian
function. 20 Our federal institutions do not exist to thwart self-governance, but
to preserve it.
Part I of this Article examines and critiques Professor Amar's argument that
the people may directly amend the Constitution without having to comply
with Article V. An examination of the Framers' deliberate inclusion of federal
principles in Article V, and the Constitution as a whole, suggests Amar's
popular sovereignty theorem to be incomplete. Part II argues that
constitutional legitimacy requires that amendments proceed on a clearly lawful
path to ratification. This Part offers suggestions for making Akhil Amar's
constitutional amendment proposal more consonant with the spirit and text of
our Constitution.
II. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT OUTSIDE OF ARTICLE V?

A. ProfessorAmar's PopularSovereignty Theorem
In a series of articles culminating with Consent of the Governed,21 Professor
Amar articulates a theory that Article V does not limit the right of the American

It was certain that the slaves were valuable, as they raised the value
of land, increased the exports and imports, and of course the revenue,
would supply the means of feeding & supporting an army, and might
in cases of emergency become themselves soldiers. As in these important
respects they were useful to the community at large, they ought not to
be excluded from the estimate of Representation. He could not however
regard them as equal freemen and could not vote for them as such.
1 FARRAND, RECORDs, at 581. Not all delegates agreed, of course. But necessity forced
compromise. "Mr. Wilson did not well see on what principle the admission of blacks in
the proportion of three fifths could be explained. ... These were difficulties however
which he thought must be overruled by the necessity of compromise." 1 id. at 587.
Professor Amar notes the economic value of slaves once the cotton gin was invented
sealed their fate in the Southern states. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1215 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Fourteenth
Amendment]. The economic value of slaves precluded consideration of their value as
citizens.
Our experiences in having other values-such as economy, efficiency, and
prejudices-should warn us about subverting the fundamental principles of republican
government. If, as Professor Amar suggests, a majority of United States citizens may
amend the Constitution, the people should heed our national experiences and mistakes.
19

See infra note 67 and accompanying text (noting problems inhering in democracies
lacking counterbalances to majoritarian rule).
20
See infra Part II.B.3 (noting that Framers understood possibility and danger of ultra
vires actions by majority).

21See Amar, Consent, supra note 7; see also Akhil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited:
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CI-n. L. REv. 1043 (1988); Akhil Reed

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss3/5
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electorate to popularly amend the Constitution. 22 What he posits to be his "First
Theorem" rests on the proposition that the people who constitute the electorate
may elect to reconstitute the Constitution to more closely reflect their
constitution. 23 As a corollary, Professor Amar reasons that this right of the
people to amend the Constitution cannot be denied even though the
Constitution does not expressly recognize such an exercise of popular
sovereignty. Instead, the Constitution represents a grant of political power by
the citizenry to representatives who accept that power with all of the limitations
expressed therein. These limitations exist only in the exercise of delegated
powers flowing from the people, not on the origin of that power, the people
themselves. Viewed in this light, Article V's express constraints on
constitutional amendment procedures appear inapplicable to the people
themselves. Those procedural constraints, however, are not meaningless
because they apply to the use of powers delegated by the people.
1. The Corollary-Article V's Applicability to Federal Officials Only
Article V's specific instructions for the amending process can be read to
preclude any other method of constitutional amendment under the principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.24 According to this principle of
construction, Article V provides the only lawful method for constitutional
amendment. Professor Amar contends that this construction makes sense only
in considering the amendatory power of Congress. Federal officials cannot
properly overstep their limited grant of power to amend the Constitution as
provided by Article V.25 To do so would render their actions ultra vires, a
usurpation of powers that the people have not chosen to delegate.
But, under Amar's theorem, to apply this expressio unius construction of
Article V to the power of the people to amend the Constitution makes no sense.
He argues that the Framers understood that the people were the origin and
residuaries of the power to alter their system of government.26 Any articulation

Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION, supra note 8, at 89.
22

See generally Amar, Consent, supra note 7.

231d. at 504 ("Popular sovereignty does not prevent us from striking a balance in our
own minds that strongly privileges the constitutional status quo. But popular
sovereignty does prevent us from denying future generations of popular
majorities-our posterity-the right to strike a different balance.").
24
"Expressio unius" refers to a maxim of construction that excludes options not
included in a list because the list's specificity implies that it to be comprehensive. See
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius").
25

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 460 ("Precisely because ordinary Government is
distrusted, it may not amend the Constitution without amassing an extraordinary bloc
of Government officials").
26

1d. at 473-87.
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of their constitutional amendment power would be redundant, mere
surplusage. For this reason, Professor Amar contends that Article V's silence
on the matter of popular constitutional amendment supports, rather than
precludes, the existence of that right. 27 Thus rejecting the exclusio unius
construction of Article V, Professor Amar concludes that the people may
directly amend the Constitution. 28 The generation that drafted, debated and
29
ratified the Constitution, he asserts, understood that power as inalienable.
The specific instructions of Article V apply only to governmental officials as a
grant of powers delegated by the people. As with most grants, however, it came
with strings attached.
2. Framers' Concerns About a Distant, Unresponsive Federal Government
Professor Amar characterizes the high hurdles imposed by Article
V-requiring either two-thirds of Congress in conjunction with three-quarters
of the states or three-quarters of states and a constitutional convention-as
designed to prevent self-dealing by federal officials. Article V thus represents
the Framers' solution to the possibility of a renegade federal government by
requiring both a supermajority of Congress and a supermajority of state
legislatures. 30 The Framers intended these onerous requirements to keep a
distant government-one that might become unresponsive to the wishes of the
people-in check.
Because the Framers recognized the people as ultimate guardians of
republican government,3 1 Amar reasons that these high hurdles laid out to
prevent self-aggrandizement make no sense as a check on the people
themselves. 32 The constitutional red tape of Article V binds federal officials
only-the people need not take a number and wait to be served.
3. Professor Amar's Concerns About a Distant, Unresponsive Federal
Government
Article V's constraints not only check self-aggrandizement but may cause
such friction in the constitutional amendment system that inertia results.
Another contributing factor to governmental inertia may be that distant federal

27

1d. at 459 ("Begin by noting what Article V does not say. It emphatically does not
say that it is the only way to revise the Constitution.").
28
d. at 459-61.
29

d. at 473-87.

30Amar, Consent, supra note 7.
31

See U.S. CONST. amend. II (providing for strong states by guaranteeing "right to
bear arms" to protect against the central government).
32
See Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 460 ("Popular sovereignty cannot be satisfied
by a Government monopoly on amendment, for the Government might simply block
any constitutional change that limits Government's power, even if strongly desired by
the People.").
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss3/5
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officials refuse to respond to locally felt needs. Because inertia may so favor
federal officials or so little affect them, Professor Amar supports the power of
33
the people to take direct action on constitutional issues.
Professor Amar argues that the Framers drafted the Bill of Rights to affirm
their understanding that the new federal government must yield to the
collective people.34 He points to the Bill of Rights' express declaration of the
allocation of power between the federal government on the one side and the
reserved powers of states and the people on the other.35 The Bill of Rights, he
argues, memorialized what the Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood:
that power in our republic resides in the people themselves. Professor Amar
concludes that the Bill of Rights was intended to guard against self-dealing of
federal governmental officials by ensuring the strength of the states, 36 checking
the power of Congress to enrich itself,37 and precluding subtle intimidation
38
tactics via use of federal troops.

B. A Critiqueof ProfessorAmar's PopularSovereignty Theorem
Although Professor Amar presents an inviting argument, a number of
problems inhere in his popular amendment proposal. First, history shows that
the people's right to directly affect the federal government requires an enabling
amendment, passed in strict conformity with Article V constraints. Second, the

33

1d. Professor Amar's worries about a distant, unresponsive government are not
new. During the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists shared the same concerns. See,
e.g., "An Old Whig" [George Bryan et al.] I (Oct. 12, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 123; Speech of
Patrick Dollard in South Carolina Ratifying Convention, in 2 DEBATE, at 593; Patrick
Henry Elaborates His Main Objections in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12,
1788), in 2 DEBATE, at 677-79. See generally Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists
Were For, in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 48-52 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981) (noting
that Anti-Federalists feared that "aristocratic character of organized civil society tends
to become more severe and more selective over time, and the main efforts of constitution
makers should be directed to at least putting obstacles in its way.").
34

See generally Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 11.

35

1d. at 1199-1201.

36

Id. at 1162-64 (discussing Framers' understanding that Second Amendment
ensured strong, free states); see also U.S. CONST. amend. II (declaring that "right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.").
37

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (originally second of twelve amendments proposed
as Bill of Rights); see also Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 11, at 1145-46 (discussing
proposed second amendment now certified as Twenty-Seventh Amendment); RICHARD
B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA, IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO

MUCH WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 243-49 (1993) (discussing adoption of
Twenty-Seventh Amendment).
38

See U.S. CONST. amend. III (precluding quartering of soldiers, in time of peace,
without owner's consent). The Third Amendment served to preclude "insidious forms
of military occupation, featuring federal soldiers cowing civilians by psychological
guerrilla warfare, day by day and house by house .... See Amar, Bill of Rights, supra
note 11, at 1174.
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Framers did not acknowledge the popular constitutional amendment plan that
Professor Amar advances. To the contrary, Federalists and Anti-Federalists
alike acknowledged that Article V's procedures would be exclusive. Third, the
people's remedy to an unresponsive federal government already exists-but
has remained unused. Ultimately, Amar's concerns about tyranny by federal
officials should be allayed -at least in part- by this dormant remedy.
1. The Lesson of the Seventeenth Amendment
If popular sovereignty allows the people to directly affect the federal
government, even in instances in which the Constitution does not so recognize,
then the Seventeenth Amendment would have been unnecessary. The people
could simply have started directly voting for senators. Although the method
for choosing senators was prescribed by the Constitution, 39 the
people-according to Professor Amar's reasoning-could have simply chosen
to govern themselves.
The existence of the Seventeenth Amendment, however, indicates the
requirement of a constitutional amendment-in compliance with Article V-to
vest a power in the people that the original Constitution reposed in the state
legislatures. 40 The Constitution originally provided that state legislators
choose federal senators. 4 1 Not until the Seventeenth Amendment passed could
the people directly choose senators. Article I, section 3-which provided for
election of senators by state legislatures-used the same wording "shall" as
does Article V. Consider the imperative language of Article I, section 3 in
providing that "[tihe Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each state, chosen by the Legislature thereof ... .42
Similarly, Article V contains the same imperative in providing procedures
for amendments "which, in eithercase, shallbe valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as part of this Constitution ... as one or the other mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress .... "43 Professor Amar argues that this imperative
language of Article V does not preclude the people from directly amending the
Constitution. But he fails to distinguish between the nature of the imperatives
in Article V and those used in other articles. Instead, he argues that the
statements of leading Framers, including James Wilson and The Federalist
authors, indicate that those who framed and ratified the Constitution

39U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that state legislatures elect senators), amended

by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
40

See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 ("The electors in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state
legislatures."). The Seventeenth Amendment was enacted to supersede Article I, Section
3, of the Constitution. That section provided that the two Senators of each state be chosen
by that state's legislature. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
41U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
43U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss3/5
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understood the people to retain the power to choose their form of government
directly.44 Professor Amar, however, fails to explain why the evidence
supporting the power of the people to vote on constitutional amendments
should not also have had the power to vote for senators.
Just as the Framers did not accord the decision on the matter of senators to
the people, they did not accord the decision on the matter of constitutional
amendment directly to the people. What is important about the textual
commitment of these important decisions to the Congress, the state
legislatures, or a body of special electors is that it reveals the Framers'
conception of the relation between the people and their representatives. That
conception was one characterized, in part, by wariness of pure democracy.
This wariness shows not only in the mode of senatorial elections or
constitutional amendments, but also in the process of choosing the executive.
None of these are by majority vote of the electorate. In Federalist No. 68,
Hamilton intimated that citizens generally will not "possess the information
and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation" as choosing "a
magistrate who was to have so important an agency in the administration of
the government of the United States."45 Thus, the Framers adopted
'precautions" against the "mischief" to which the people might fall prey. Such
mischief was thought to include "[t]alents for low intrigue, and the little arts of
popularity, [which] may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a
single State.... ,46 Ultimately, the Philadelphia convention delegates did not
repose their confidence in the people for purposes of electing senators, 4 7
presidents4 8 or judges. 49 The people only directly elected their federal

44Clearly, however, this was not the intent of the Framers. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at
148-49 (recounting delegates' rejection of James Wilson's proposal to have the people
themselves elect senators); EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 82 (1964) ("Wilson had consistently favored election of Senators by the people
rather than by state legislatures. The latter mode, however, was accepted upon
Dickinson's motion."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 410-11 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
45

THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Amar, however, downplays the significance of the electoral requirement by noting that
today presidential elections are de facto popular elections. The authors characterize the
practices of several states in "purporting to legally bind their electoral collegians to vote
for the candidates selected by the state voters in the general election" as "a basic feature
of today's 'unwritten constitution'--"an informal constitutional amendment of
sorts.... See Amar & Amar, supra note 2, at 919.
Yet, the significance of the electoral requirement remains central to our inquiry into
the system that the Constitution of 1787 anticipates. The ignorance of Constitutional
imperatives may informally amend constitutional practice. This is not the sort of
constitutional amendment, however, that we concern ourselves with as a matter of
principle.
46

THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

47

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.

48

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 1 & 2.
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representatives to the House and state legislators. A popular sovereignty theory
alone cannot explain the necessity of the Seventeenth Amendment to allow the
people to directly elect senators.
2. What the Framers Did Not Say About Constitutional Amendment
Similarly, the principle of popular sovereignty alone cannot explain-or
even anticipate-any hurdles in the way of the people to amend the
Constitution. Yet, for the same reason that the principle of popular sovereignty
cannot account for the necessity of the Seventeenth Amendment, so too
Professor Amar's argument in favor of popular constitutional amendment
avails itself of only one of the two premises upon which this republic is
founded.
The first principle of republican government-which Professor Amar refers
to as popular sovereignty-recognizes the people as the ultimate political
agents in a republican form of government in their prerogative to directly
determine issues by voting. This quality exists in our constitutional system to
the extent that "the supreme and ultimate authority [resides] in the majority of
the people of the Union .... "50 Although this is the animating theme of
republican government, it tells only half the story. Thus, Madison explained
that majoritarian action alone-which he characterized as the "national"
principle, and which we might characterize as "pure democracy"-is
insufficient, by itself, to alter or abolish the Constitution.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which
amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national nor
wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate
authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and
this authority would be competent at all times like that of a majority
of every national
society to alter or abolish its established
51
government.
Instead, such a national movement of the American electorate toward
amendment can only succeed
in conjunction with the federal part of
52
our system of government.

49

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The list of unelected federal officials also includes
"Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, . .. and all other Officers of the
United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for .... "
50
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
51
1d.
52
1d. In explaining that the "mode provided by the plan of the convention is not
founded on either of these [national or federal] principles," Madison explained that
Article V ultimately incorporates a blend of the two principles. "In requiring more than
a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it
departs from the national and advances towards the federal character .... " Id. Note
Madison's express dismissal of any possibility that the amendment process involves
only federal or only popular principles. It is for this reason that Professor Amar's
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The second principle upon which our republican government rests is what
Madison called the "federal" nature of our republic. Congress, the President,
and the Supreme Court, in addition to the state governments represent the
much
federal heart of our government. The miracle of Philadelphia is not so
for a
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federalism served to "make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
56
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."
Nonetheless, federalism was not intended to undermine the national,
democratic principle in the amendment process because no amendments may
be ratified except with national approval. Madison's explanation of our
republic as one "neither wholly national, nor wholly federal"57 applies not only
to the Constitution, but also to the process of amending that Constitution.
Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State
in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be
binding on all. The mode provided by58the plan of the convention is not
founded on either of these principles.
Federalism and democracy exist as twin principles of constitutional
amendment and the constitutional scheme itself.59
As Professor Amar acknowledges, Madison's statements preclude popular
constitutional amendment. 6 0 Because our government is not exclusively
national in character, the majority of the people cannot directly amend the
United States Constitution.6 1 Because Professor Amar's argument does not
56

THE FEDERAuST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

57

THE FEDERALISr No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
d. Even though federalism was part of the solution, unchecked federalism was
equally problematic as unchecked (some commentators say "unfiltered") popular
election. There was a need to balance national principles against federal principles. Thus,
Madison noted that the amendment process "in rendering the concurrence of less than
the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the federaland partakes of the national
character." Id.
58

59

This understanding of the dual federalist and nationalist nature of the Constitution
was a recurring theme in the Philadelphia convention. The eventual compromise that
resolved the issue of representation in the Senate-"the most violent of the controversies
which marked the deliberations of the convention"-incorporated both elements.
DUMBAULD, supra note 44, at 81. Once the delegates agreed on proportional
representation in the House of Representatives, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut
proposed equal representation of states in the Senate; the plan which was eventually
adopted. He reasoned:
We were partly national; partly federal. The proportional representation
in the first branch [i:e., House of Representatives] was comfortable to the
national principle & would secure the large States agst. the small. An
equality of voices was comfortable to the federal principle and was
necessary to secure the Small States agst. the large. He trusted that on
this middle ground compromise would take place. He did not see that
it could on any other.
1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 468-69 (June 29).
60

Amar, Consent, note 7, at 507.

61Indeed, Madison clearly explained the reasons for the denial of such a role in the
amendment process to the people. He stated:
The passions,therefore, not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment.
But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate
the government.... It appears in this that occasional appeals to the people
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encompass the federal nature of the Constitution system, it does not fully
acknowledge the need for checking inclinations of the majority. But
amendment can only succeed in conjunction with the federal part of our system
of government. In order to formulate a theory of constitutional amendment
that remains faithful to the nature of our republic, we must understand why
the Framers thought that federalism principles must inhere in the process of
amending the Constitution.
62
3. What Tempers the Tyranny of the Majority in the United States

Each of the Article V constitutional amendment procedures evidence the
63
Framers' combination of national and federal principles in the Constitution.
The first procedure begins with the federal government, Congress specifically,
proposing amendments. (The national complement is the ratification by
three-quarters of the several states.) The second procedure involves Congress's
function in calling a convention for purposes of proposing an amendment.
(Here, the national component involves both the call of the several states for
such a convention and the states' subsequent ratification of the proposed
amendment of that convention.) Article V does not expressly dictate the type
of convention or even the membership of the convention that Congress must
call. Thus, the prospect of a convention seems to strike fear into the hearts of
some scholars,64 seemingly due to the uncertainty of a constitutional event that
has not yet happened.
65
But this trepidation of modern thinkers was not shared by the Framers,
who saw the convention as an opportunity of Congress to ensure that the
drafting of constitutional amendments lies with wise, deliberate drafters,
rather than conniving agents of the factions that clamor for the amendment. In
discussing the prospect of leaving the process of constitutional amendment
entirely to the people, Madison feared intrigue:

[to amend the Constitution] would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that purpose.
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 317 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The failure
of the Council of Censors, who under the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 were to
recommend whether to call a convention for improvements, had proven extremely
problematic due to political wrangling. This precedent was not lost on the Framers. See
BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 37, at 9; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 339 (1969).
62

See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 262-72 (J.P. Mayer

ed., 1969) (Part II, Chapter 8: "What Tempers the Tyranny of the Majority in the United
States").
63

See infra Part III.B.

64

See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a
ConstitutionalConvention to Proposea Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979).
65

Madison, however, did acknowledge reservations about leaving the instructions
to Congress about convening conventions for proposing amendments in such laconic
form. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 558.
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[I]t could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question.
It would be inevitably connected with the spirit of pre-existing parties,
or of parties springing out of the question itself ....

It would be

pronounced by the very men who had been agents66in, or opponents
of, the measure to which the decision would relate.
The lessons of the volatility of preceding direct democracies had not been lost
on the Framers. 67 Thus, they erected federal checks on the possibility of ultra
vires actions by factions and partisan interests that would disrupt the domestic
tran- quillity and injure the rights of other citizens to the point of defeating the
basic aims of the republic. 68 When considering the injury to private rights
especially,

66

THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 317 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

67

Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24,1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 196-97
(arguing that ancient democracies failed because of "the prominence of the local over
the federal authority"). Madison thought the lessons of history so important that he not
only arrived at the convention having studied the ancient democratic republics, but
devoted Federalist Nos. 18, 19, and 20 to a discussion of the histories of the ancient
democracies. Adrienne Koch, Introduction to MADISON's NOTES, at xiii-xiv (noting that
Madison "came to the Convention after an intensive scholarly preparation"). Thus,
Madison was aware of the dangers of volatility that many previous democracies had
succumbed to: "Hence, it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security
or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have
been violent in their deaths." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). In Madison's survey of the successes and failures of democratic
governments, he found one character that he thought contributed to the stability and
lawfulness of democracy. "[T]he popular government, which was so tempestuous
elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaen republic, because it was
there tempered by the general authority and laws of the confederacy." THE FEDERALIST
No. 18, at 126 (James Madison with Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Thus, we see that Madison and Hamilton understood that federal principles temper
tyranny of the popular will.
James Wilson also engaged in a historiography of federalism during the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention that displayed his command of and concern for
political precedents. See James Wilson's Opening Address (Nov. 24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE,
at 796-97 (discussing examples of Achaen and Lycian leagues, Amphyctionic council,
United Netherlands, Germanic Body, House of Austria).
We must not forget these ancient historical lessons that the Framers so carefully
heeded. Neither can we ignore the mob violence, rebellions, and rioting that "at one time
or another paralyzed all the major cities" in America during the eighteenth century. See
WOOD, supra note 61 at 319-28 (1969) (noting that "more such groups sprang up in the
dozen years after Independence than in the entire colonial period."). Rather, in the
Philadelphia convention, the delegates brought a sense of history, ancient and recent,
to the framing of republican government that was hoped to ensure "domestic
tranquillity" for generations, even onto "our posterity." Id.
68

Butt see Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 503. ("In the end, individual rights in our
system are, and should be, the product of ultimately majoritarian processes. Once again,
there is nothing paradoxical about this. Sloppy philosophical rhetoric notwithstanding,
there is nothing in the ontological character of a "right" that requires that it be vested in
an "'individual"' or "'minority"' against the 'majority'.") Professor Amar's contention
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even action by a majority would be ultra vires. 69 Madison and a number of the
other Framers understood the power and danger of majoritarian action. The

plays a nice game in casting rights as complementary with majoritarian action.
Ideally, rights and popular sovereignty coexist peacefully. But a right marks
territory beyond which even a majority cannot act. Rights affirm that even the good of
a many cannot justify treading upon the rights of even one. Utilitarianism strives to
maximize popular agency for the public good, but cannot account for individual rights,
even if Professor Amar would so like. Otherwise, why not let Congress pass bills of
attainder? If more people want to see someone they are sure is guilty convicted than
those who believe that person should at least receive a fair trial, why not let a clear
majority, or even supermajority, so decide? Justice and popular action are not
synonymous and cannot be conflated.
Although Professor Amar correctly asserts that rights can be majoritarian in nature,
even this does not mean that the majority can act in any way that it wishes. Amar, Bill
of Rights, supra note 11, at 120; Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 504. Majoritarian rights
mark the limit beyond which the majority cannot transgress. The Framers understood
the lessons of history that taught that majorities can undermine their own authority and
efficacy. Thus, the Federalists understood that the government must have the power to
defend itself against monarchical or aristocratic inventions. Why, because these violate
majoritarian rights even if a majority has such an inclination.
69
1n making these points, I am aware of thoughtful scholarship to the contrary.
Specifically, Bruce Ackerman's two-tiered theory of constitutional politics stands at
odds with assertions that any procedures for handling "constitutional moments" must
anticipate divisiveness, intrigue, and mania. Ackerman contends that during these
constitutional moments Americans put away the apathy, pettiness, and unthinking
allegiances that usually prevail.
Professor Ackerman's contention, however, has received criticism that draws on
the empirical data of constitutional moments on the state level when the people of the
states directly amend their state constitutions. See generallyPhilip J. Weiser, Ackerman's
Proposalfor Popular ConstitutionalLawmaking: Can it Realize His Aspirationsfor Dualist
Democracy?, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907, 920 (1993) ("[A]s envisioned by Ackerman, 'apathy
will give way to concern, ignorance to information, selfishness to serious reflection on
the country's future.' (quoting Ackerman) In this transformation, the country would
temporarily transcend the evils of faction which may be constrained, but never
completely overcome, within America's pluralist political system."). Skepticism about
validity of Professor Ackerman's transcendental constitutional moment appears to be
well founded. As a fundamental matter-and the Constitution is our most fundamental
matter-we cannot base our republican system on hopes of best case scenarios.
Even if Professor Ackerman is right for the most part, we must anticipate
permanent injury to our cultural and political fabric that can arise on the truly divisive
issues that require a constitutional amendment to be realized and have the zealous
support of a good portion of the electorate. The Federalists hoped for the best, but
planned for the worst. By contrast, Professor Ackerman's theory does not anticipate,
and thus does not address the intrigues, manias, division, and factions that Madison
anticipated.
Similarly, Professor Amar's first theorem does not account the possibility that a
faction of the majority could act unlawfully. Nonetheless, majorities can deny minorities
or individuals their rights to life, liberty, and property in such a way that makes a
mockery of the principles expressed in the Constitution that Professor Amar contends
allows them to take such action. Real examples of people directly amending their
constitutions to entrench racist discrimination in that governing document exist, even
though only at the state level. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (racially
discriminatory effect on private land sales). Professor Amar neither acknowledges this,
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fact that a majority acts qua majority does not legitimate the denial of lawfully
granted rights. 70 Madison stated:
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest
both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the
public good and private rights against the danger of such afaction,and
it then is
at the same time preserve the form of popular government,
71
the great object to which our inquiries are directed.
Majoritarian action can be a rule of force rather than rule of law unless it has
limits beyond which it cannot lawfully be exercised. The Framers recognized
the dual nature of strength in numbers.
The Framers understood that majoritarian government is the best guard
against the sort of unresponsive despotism that the colonies had revolted
against. This, of course, affirms that our government derives its legitimacy from
the consent of the governed. On this point, Professor Amar's theorem captures
the importance of the democratic element of our government. Throughout the
Philadelphia convention and subsequent ratification debates, the Framers
consistently acknowledged this democratic element to be essential to the new
governmental scheme. 72
Nonetheless, the Framers understood that majorities can also act to the
detriment of individual and minority rights, can undermine its own authority,
and can permanently injure the system of government within which it
operates. 73 Thus, the Framers tempered the power of the majority even while
enshrining that power as central to our system of government. 74 Madison

nor does he offer a solution to this denial of rights by the majority to work on the national
level.
Even today, Madison's plan is visionary. Only it anticipates and addresses these
problems of popular amendment of the Constitution.
70
Whether a minority or a majority acts does not change the nature of the actions
lawfulness or legitimacy. Madison explained: "By faction I understand a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
71

1d. at 80 (emphasis added).

72

See generally Amar, Central Meaning, supra note 52.

73

See THE FEDERALIST No. 18 (James Madison with Alexander Hamilton) (discussing
histories of and lessons to be drawn from ancient Athens, Sparta, Lacedaemonia, Thebes,
and Achaean league).
74

But see Thomas Jefferson, Inauguration Address (March 4, 1801), reprinted in THE

LIFE AND SELECrED WRmINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 324 (Adrienne Koch & William

Peden eds., 1972) ("[It is proper that you should understand what I deem the essential
principles of government [including] absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the
majority-the vital principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to force
.... ") (emphasis added); Thomas Jefferson, The Will of the Majority Should Always
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noted: "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions." 75
The solution for preserving a vital popular power in the people while
guarding against its ultra vires exercise, was the same as their solution for
instituting legislative, executive, and judicial powers in our government while
preventing those powers from becoming oppressive. In short, that solution
involved separation and balancing of powers-our "checks and balances"
system. Although we tend to think of checks and balances as between
coordinate branches of the federal government, the Framers also applied the
principles to the federal relation between the central government, states, and
electorate.
Just as it makes no sense to determine which coordinate branch is the
ultimate branch 76 in a system of coordinate branches, so too it makes little sense
to ask which, popular sovereignty or federalism, is the central principle of our
republican government. Federalism and the national principle together
represent the core of our republican system of government. They are separate,
irreducible, equal loci of the power that inhere in our system of government
under the Constitution.
Thus, it is significant that Madison did not call it a "democratic" government
when arguing for the adoption of the Constitution in The Federalist.Rather, he
characterized it as a "republican" form of government. 77 What distinguished
the new republican form from the purely democratic governments that had
preceded it was the fact that political power was not to be exercised only
according to majoritarian principles, but also in accordance with federalism. 78
The majoritarian nature of the government was anticipated to be the driving
force for change. 79 Thus, the Framers provided for a way that majoritarian
action may lead to constitutional change. Nonetheless, in amending that
government, the Framers recognized the need for checks and balances to
operate there also against the rule by strength that so often had the effect of
concentrating power too narrowly.

Prevail: Thomas Jefferson Replies to Madison, in 1 DEBATE, at 213.
75
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
James Wilson's Opening Address, in DEBATE, at 795 (arguing that representation and
federal nature of new republic would provide more desirable government than under
Articles of Confederation).
76

Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 475 U.S. 1007 (1986).

77

See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).

78

See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

79

The Framers consistently recognized the people as the engine of the republican
system, as Professor Amar proves. However, this begins rather than ends the inquiry
into how they may exercise that role.
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In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of
republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to
the system against aristocratic or
possess authority to defend
80
monarchical innovations.
The principles of federalism that check against the possible pernicious
innovations of the majority are clearly set forth in Article V. Both methods for
amending the Constitution according to Article V involve Congress. Congress
proposes the amendment, or calls the constitutional convention for purposes
of proposing the amendment. In short, Article V anticipates that a coordinate
branch of the central government be involved with the process of amending
the Constitution. This is the federal principle that is built into the lawful process
for amending our system of government.
4. What Tempers the Tyranny of the Federal Government
Ultimately, the Framers rejected the original proposal under the Virginia
plan that "provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of the
Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National
Legislature ought not to be required thereto. "81 Article V was ultimately written
to provide for the amendment of the Constitution. 82 Even though the Framers
involved a branch of the federal government in both methods of amendment,
they did not forget the essential point of the Virginia proposal, which was
intended to provide a constitutional remedy against an unresponsive federal
government.
Because Congress would necessarily be involved under the Article V plan,
some of the delegates worried that Congress could stymie all necessary
improvements to the government. George Mason worried that "[a]s the
proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend, in the first
immediately, in the second, ultimately, on Congress, not amendments of the
proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should
become oppressive.' 83
In response, Gouverneur Morris and Elbridge Gerry proposed a solution to
tempering such tyranny by the federal government. Their plan required that a
convention for purposes of proposing an amendment must be convened by
Congress when demanded by two-thirds of the states. 84 Ultimately, this

80

THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

81Journal Entry by James Madison (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND,
82

RECORDS,

at 22.

See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing Article V's requirement that Congress either

propose an amendment or call special convention for purpose of proposing

amendment).
83

Journal Entry by James Madison (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 629.

84

2id.
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measure passed. 85 In providing for amendment procedures that tempered both
tyranny by the majority and tyranny by the federal government, the Framers
struck a delicate balance. Thus, at the end of the day-literally-the
Constitution was ordered engrossed. 86
Although history has ignored the second amendment procedure, its
significance as a bulwark against tyranny by the federal government has not
87
diminished.
The second of the two methods of proposing amendments to the
Constitution provided in this article (namely a convention called at the
request of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states) has never been
used. Yet its existence continues to serve the purpose which
Gouverneur Morris had in mind when he proposed it. It places an
effective remedy at the disposition of the people of the states if abuses
on the part of Congress itself should become an88evil requiring
amendment and Congress should fail or refuse to act.
This guarantee that Congress cannot overcome a national impetus for an
89
amendment had great significance during the Constitution's ratification. Just
as the proper balancing of the federal and democratic principles of our
852 id. at 629-30.
862 id.
87

But see Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 1971 (1994). Without elaboration, Kobach asserts that calls for
constitutional convention are "hopeless" even in instances in which three-fourths of
states appear to favor particular constitutional change. Id. at 1973. Surprisingly, this
commentator's skepticism of this Article V route is not founded on the difficulty in
getting two-thirds of states to call for a constitutional convention, but the mere fact that
this procedure has never been successfully implemented. Kobach acknowledges that in
the case of the Seventeenth Amendment, two-thirds of states had taken some sort of
action to formally support popular senate elections, whether by statute or by amending
the state constitution. Nonetheless, Kobach declares that the calls for convention by
some of the states "could never be as decisive as the electoral interests of the Senators
from the 28 states that had already effectively adopted popular election." Id. at 1979 n.36.
This reasoning inexplicably conflates dormancy and ineffectiveness. Moreover, it
ignores Hamilton's assertion, in Federalist No. 85, that the call for a convention must
result in congressional action to that end.
Interestingly, Kobach acknowledges that the option for a call of a constitutional
convention may ultimately have spurred the Congress to propose its own version before
having to call a convention and cede that prerogative.
[A]n alternative theory as to why the Senate ultimately capitulated and
endorsed the Seventeenth Amendment [is] that numerous states had
called for a national proposing convention to address the issue.
...[T]he possibility of the necessary two-thirds of the states eventually
making such a call pushed the Senate into action.
Id. at 1979 n.36; see also William Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution:Part I,
Processes of Change, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 933, 943.
88

DUMBAULD, supra note 44, at 435; see also 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 629-30.

89

See THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).
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republican government drew the Philadelphia convention to a close, so too did
The Federalistconclude with the promise of a better union as illustrated by the
plan for amendments.
Hamilton's Federalist No. 85 drew the series to a close on a note of
pragmatism and promise. Although Hamilton conceded that the Constitution
was a work of compromises, less than ideal on a number of points, he argued
that it was a sound plan which would only improve with time.9 0 Amendments,
of course, held the key to perfecting the new system of government. 91 And the
new government need not be feared to refuse improvements as had the British
monarchy in light of the second method of amendment provided for in Article
V.92 Hamilton declared: "Thewords of this article are peremptory. The Congress
'shall call a convention.' Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that
body.... We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect
barriers against the encroachments of the national authority."93 The second
route of Article V represents the promise that the federal government may not
94
remain immobile in the face of national demand.
In sum, the Framers' balancing of federal and democratic principles in
Article V tempers both the possibility of tyranny by the federal government or
by a majority. Any comprehensive understanding of the constitutional
amendment process must incorporate both principles. Our republican system
of government does not rest upon popular sovereignty alone, but instead has
two legs to stand on. Professor Amar's assertion that popular action suffices to
amend the Constitution has some basis in Gouverneur Morris's contribution
to Article V. Yet, despite Professor Amar's argument to the contrary, the
Framers intended Article V to provide exclusive means for lawful
constitutional change.
Il. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS

Article V specifies exactly two procedures for amending the Constitution.
An examination of Article V's origin in the Philadelphia convention and its
controversy during the ratification debates reveals elements common to each
amendment procedure. These elements incorporate the federal and democratic
principles that pervade the Constitution as a whole. Specifically, each Article
V procedure requires Congress to act, either state legislatures or conventions
to ratify, and each step to be carried by a supermajority vote. The Framers
intended these elements to provide both "safe" and "easy" procedures for

90

THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 523-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

91

And, indeed, the provision for amendments helped secure its initial adoption.

92

1d. at 525-26.

93

1d. at 526.

94

See infra note 87 (noting scholarship suggesting that Senate action in proposing
Seventeenth Amendment was spurred when number of states calling for convention on
that issue approached two-thirds of states requirement).
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constitutional amendment so that governmental change need not proceed from
violence or convulsions. 95
In contrast, Professor Amar's popular amendment proposal lacks all but one
of these elements. 96 Because his proposed procedure departs so radically from
the elements of amendment thought essential by the Framers, any amendment
following his suggestions must be of suspect validity. Present doubt even about
the validity of "existing" amendments suggests that a new procedure, if it is
97
even to have a chance, must comply at least with the spirit of the Constitution.
As discussed above, the federal and democratic principles serving as the basis
for the overall architecture of the Constitution must also be present in changing
that document. To this end, this Article suggests that a slight recasting of
98
Professor Amar's proposal may contribute to its viability.
A. The Article V ProceduralQuatrefoil
Article V's first procedure involves amendments that originate in the
Congress. To date, all amendments have traveled this path. The second

95

0n the matter of amendments, Mason noted the necessity of an alterable
Constitution so that bloody revolutions need not precede every improvement of
government. "Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide
for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and
violence." 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 202-03.
96

See infra Part II.C (analyzing Professor Amar's proposed procedure in terms of four
elements inhering in Article V).
97

For example, consider the Thirteenth Amendment. Ratification of the Amendment

was plied upon 11 states that were under military occupation. Moreover, the attempted
rescissions of Delaware and Kentucky were ignored. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note
37, at 101-03.
The Fourteenth Amendment lacked sufficient ratifications if states are allowed to
rescind their ratifications. JOHN VILE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 6 (1993) (noting that ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment was unclear because of uncertainty about inclusion of seceding states in
requisite number and ability of states to rescind earlier ratifications).
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment took so long to ratify, that its sporadic
ratifications over the course of 202 years may have given birth to a stillborn amendment.

Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States ConstitutionBeen Amended? (A)
<26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION, supra note 8, at 25 n.39 ("[Tihe so-called Twenty-seventh Amendment is
a professorial godsend for the questions it raises about the operation of Article V as a
vehicle for amendment.")
Moreover, additional problematic issues have arisen from amendments that did
not receive the necessary ratifications. For example, consider the equal rights
amendment, which raised the question of whether Congress may extend a ratification

deadline. Compare Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, 57
TEX. L. REV. 919, 919-45 (1979) with Grover Rees III, "Throwing Away the Key:" The
Unconstitutionalityof the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 TEX. L. REV. 875, 875-932
(1980).
98
Subject to the doubts expressed above in noting the necessity of the Seventeenth
Amendment, see infra Part II.D.
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procedure involves amendments that originate in a special convention, called
upon demand of two-thirds of the state legislatures. Although this latter
procedure has been attempted-several times verging on the two-thirds
requisite 99-no amendments have ever been established this way.100
1. Amendments Originating in Congress
The first Article V procedure requires that an amendment originate by a
two-thirds vote of Congress. Then, the amendment must receive the ratification
of three-quarters of the state legislatures or special conventions in the states. 101
All twenty-seven ratified Amendments have proceeded along this path, with
102
only once-for
state legislatures being the preferred "Mode of Ratification"
the Twenty-First Amendment repeal of prohibition-has Congress specified
ratification by this second mode. 103
From the outset of the Philadelphia convention, the Framers were aware of
104
the need for an effective method for amending the new form of government.
Ironically, the procedure of amendment by which all of the constitutional
amendments have been ratified was not among early amendment provisions
considered by the convention. Instead, it arose only later in the summer as a
reaction to the prevailing plan that did not give Congress the power to propose
amendments. 105 In response, Hamilton contended that states would amend the
Constitution only to increase their own powers, and to the detriment of the

99
See ABA
states).

STUDY,

supra note 13, at 59-77 (collecting main categories of calls made by

10OProposal of an amendment by constitutional convention has not yet occurred.
DUMBAULD, supra note 44, at 435.
101 U.S. CONST. art. V.
1021d. Note that Congress determines whether the state legislatures or special
conventions in the states be the "Mode of Ratification." Thus, some states may not ratify
by legislative assent, while others call special conventions. Instead, the states must
comply with the Congressional determination. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S.
716, 730 (1931).
Ratification by state conventions has occurred only once; in the case of the repeal
of prohibition. See Kobach, supra note 87, at 1974 n.9. Again, Congress has sole power
to determine whether an amendment shall be ratified by state legislatures or
conventions. U.S. CONST. art. V.
103U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 3; See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 37, at 176 (noting
unique circumstances attending prohibition repeal leading to congressional
specification of state conventions as means for ratification); see also 1 DEBATE, at 981-93
(listing methods for ratification specified by Congress).
104

See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 22 (May 29) (Virginia resolution XIII); 1 id. at 27
(Governor Randolph's propositions founded on "republican Principles" calling for
amendment mechanism); 1 id. at 202-203 (Mason's exhortation to provide for "easy,
regular" constitutional amendment).
105
See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 148, 188, 461, 467-468; see also DUMBAULD, supra note
44, at 434.
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central government. 106 Thus, he proposed that Congress itself be allowed, by
two-thirds vote of each house, to call a convention for proposing a
constitutional amendment. 107 Hamilton reasoned: "The National Legislature
will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of
amendments, and ought also to be empowered to call a Convention-.... There
could be no danger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in
the case." 108 Sherman then moved to add a provision that allowed Congress
itself to draft amendments and propose them directly to the states. 109 This was
adopted.11 0
James Wilson proposed that amendments take effect once ratified by
two-thirds of the states. 111 This proposal, however, was rejected. 112 But
Wilson's motion to increase the requisite number of states to "three fourths"
passed. 113 At this point, Madison summarized these elements to produce a
section that bears close similarity to what became Article V.114

1062 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 558 (Sept. 10). Of course, Hamilton was concerned about
lessons learned from many ancient republics' disintegrations due to usurpation of the
central authority power by localities. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting
Hamilton's study of preceding republics).
1072 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 558 (Sept. 10).
1082 id.
1092 id.
1102 id. at 558-59.
1112 id. This calculus was a reaction against the unanimity required under the Articles

of Confederation. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (U.S. 1778) ("[N]or shall any
alteration at any time hereafter be made ... unless such alteration be agreed to in a
congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every
state."). It was a sore point in that the tiniest state, Rhode Island, had blocked several
amendments and actions that were much desired by the other twelve states. See 1
Debate, at 1067, 1069; BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 37, at 17-18.
1122 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 558-59.

1132 id. at 559.
114

Madison suggested the following language:
That the Legislature of the U- S- whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution,
which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the
same shall have been ratified by three-fourths at least of the Legislatures
of the several States, or by Convention in three fourths thereof, as one or the
other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of the U.S:
2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 559 (Sept. 10). Madison's draft differs from what became Article
V in that it allowed Congress itself to draft the amendments demanded by two-thirds
of states. Ultimately, this power to draft a called-for amendment was relegated to
constitutional conventions convened for that purpose.
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2. Amendments Originating With Two-thirds of the States Legislatures
The second procedure for amending the Constitution has not yet produced
a constitutional amendment. Although this procedure received considerable
attention during the Philadelphia convention,11 5 the constitutional ratification
debates marked the start of the trend of ignoring this procedure. Since 1789,
interest in this procedure has, with few exceptions, continued to wane. A
number of modem scholars either dismiss it or argue against its use. 116
The second procedure for amending the Constitution requires that
two-thirds of state legislatures call Congress to convene a constitutional
convention for the purpose of proposing a particular amendment, and
ratification by three-quarters of the state legislatures or special conventions.11 7
Although this procedure involves Congress in convening the convention,
Congress has no discretion to decline calling a convention. 118
During the past two centuries, some topics have come close to the two-thirds
requisite, but none has received the full two-thirds requirement.11 9 This
inability to secure enough states to call for a convention was unanticipated by
the Framers who considered it to be an "easy" method for constitutional
amendment. 120 Hamilton noted that this provision responded to the difficulty
encountered in amending the Articles of Confederation. "It had been wished
by many and was much to have been desired that an easier mode for
introducing amendments had been provided by the articles of
Confederation." 121 Compared to the unanimity required by the Articles of Con-

115
From the initial presentation of the Virginia plan, this method was often the only
agreed-upon method for amendment the Constitution through until September 17.
116

See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Roulette: The Dimensions of Risk, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET 5 (1980); Kobach, supra note 87; Tribe, supranote 64.
1 7

1 It seems that citizens of a state may not constrain their legislature to issue such a
call. See Jonathan L. Walcoff, Note, The Unconstitutionalityof Voter InitiativeApplications
for FederalConvention Conventions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (1985). Again, it is the
prerogative of Congress to determine that the state legislatures be the mode of
ratification. U.S. CONST. art. V; see also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,730 (1931).
118
THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a
particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place.").
119
See WEBER & PERRY, supra note 13, at 75 (surveying state calls for convention and
concluding that "those who fear a constitutional convention should be heartened by the
unlikelihood of its ever happening.").
120

See, e.g., Patrick Henry's Speech before Virginia Ratifying Convention, in THE

ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 203 (Ralph

Ketchum ed., 1986) ("To encourage us to adopt it, they tell us, that there is a plain easy
way of getting amendments") [hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS & DEBATES].
1212 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 558; see also BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 37, at 23-24.
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federation, a two-thirds requirement seemed easy; so much so that a mere
majority of states seemed insufficient. 122
This procedure derived from the Virginia plan, which proposed that
1 23
amendments be possible without the assent of the national legislature.
Taking this into account, the Committee of Detail proposed to the convention
tha t the application of two-thirds of the state legislatures suffice to convene a
convention for proposing a particular constitutional amendment. 124 James
Madison consolidated the plans to allow amendments to originate in Congress
and by demand of the state legislatures in a draft article that proved similar to
Article V as finally accepted. The difference was that in Madison's draft
Congress was to draft the amendments called for by the states. George Mason
thought this plan to be "exceptional & dangerous. As the proposing of
amendments [would be] in both the modes to depend on, in the first
immediately, and in the second, ultimately, on Congress .... .125 Thus, the
convention agreed to shift the duty of drafting amendments called for by the
state legislatures away from Congress to a special convention. 126 Satisfied that
states thus had a remedy against an unresponsive Congress, the Framers
127
considered the Constitution to be complete.
Why did this scheme to allow states to call for amendments go by the
wayside? In the debates on the ratification of the Constitution, we may see the
beginning of the end. When the Continental Congress submitted the proposed
Constitution for ratification by the states, the famous debates ensued between
the Federalist supporters and Anti-Federalist skeptics. Despite the
Constitution's large number of admirers, modifications of the proposed
Constitution seemed to be desired by all. 128 Of these desiderata, perhaps the

122 Cf. Governor Edmund Randolph Explains Why He Now Supports the Constitution
with Amendments, in 2 DEBATE, at 603 ("For would it not be lamentable, that nothing

could be done for the defection of one State? A majority of the whole would have been
too few. Nine States therefore seem to be a most proper number.").
12 3 See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 22. Virginia plan resolution XIII stated "that provision
ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of the Union whensoever it shall
seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not be required
thereto." Id.
124

See 2 FARRAND, RECORD, at 148 (Edmund Randolph's working draft as revised by
John Rutledge); see also2 id. at 159,174. The committee forwarded this suggestion, which
was agreed to in convention. See 2 id. at 188.

1252 id., at 629.
1262 id.; see also DUMBAULD, supra note 44, at 434.
1272 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 630. Of course, this was not considered the only, or even
the main, remedy against an unresponsive Congress, but as a last resort. Election of
congressional representatives was the main remedy. See The Weakness of Brutus
Exposed: "A Citizen of Philadelphia" [Pelatiah Webster] (Nov. 8, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, at
184-185.
128 Speech of Patrick Henry in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 2
DEBATE, supra at 675 ("The necessity of amendments is universally admitted."); see also
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Anti-Federalists' desire for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights carried the greatest
weight. 129 However, even Federalist supporters offered suggestions for
improvement of the proposed government.130
Many hoped that a second convention would be held to incorporate the
various suggestions of the states in a revised plan. 131 Key supporters of the
Constitution, including Washington, Madison, Wilson, and Hamilton balked
at this idea. They feared that a second convention would fatally delay the
adoption of a badly needed new government. 132 The failure under the Articles
of Confederation to repay the colonies' war debts to their allies and often
ineffectual Congress imbued a sense of urgency into the quest for a more
effective central government. 133 Further, these key supporters who had been
present at the Philadelphia convention realized that the compromises
necessary to achieve an acceptable union would not admit much departure
from the original proposal. 134 Thus, they urged states to ratify the Constitution

Storing, supranote 33, at3 ("[T]he Constitution that came out of the deliberations of 1787
and 1788 was not the same Constitution that went in; for it was accepted subject to the
understanding that it would be amended immediately to provide for a bill of rights.").
129 See generally Storing, supra note 33, at 64-70. Of course, Anti-Federalist objections
were not limited to the lack of a Bill of Rights, but also included in their focus the
perceived pernicious effects of centralized government at the expense of state powers,
Congress' ability to raise troops even in times of peace, and the prerogative of the federal
government to impose a direct tax without consent of the states. See, e.g., Patrick Henry's
Objections to a National Army and James Madison's Reply, in 2 DEBATE, supra at 695;
"Brutus" VI (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 617 (objecting to direct taxation).
130
See, e.g., John Hancock Proposes Ratification, with Amendments Recommended
to "Quiet the Apprehensions of Gentlemen," in 1 DEBATE, at 921-922. More than two
hundred proposals for changes accompanied the ratifications of the Constitution by the
states. In fact, every state that ratified after Massachusetts followed its example and
offered recommendations. BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 37, at 23-24.
13 1

WEBER & PERRY, supra note 13, at 37-49 (discussing calls for second constitutional
convention following Philadelphia convention).
13 2
See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration that it will be far easier to obtain
subsequent than previous amendment to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is
made in the present plan it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must
undergo a new decision of each State."); Letter of George Washington to the Marquis de
Lafayette, in 2 DEBATE 179 ("Should that which is now offered to the People of America,
be found an experiment less perfect than it can be made a Constitutional door is left
open for its amelioration.").
133

See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(pointing out "precarious state" of national affairs and need for ratification of
Constitution). Indeed, Anti-Federalists too acknowledged the necessity for a more
effective central power among the colonies. See Storing, supra note 45, at 24 (noting
Anti-Federalists' interest in union).
134

E.g., Letter of George Washington to John Armstrong (April 25, 1788), in 2 DEBATE,
at 421 ("When I reflect upon these circumstances I am surprised to find that any person
who is acquainted with the critical state of our public affairs, and knows the variety of
views, interests, feelings and prejudices which must be consulted and conciliated in
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as proposed and then to seek amendments after the new government was
established.
In support of this position, the Constitution's supporters pointed out that
amendments would easily be proposed with the concurrence ten of the thirteen
states. 13 5 However, they emphasized the amendment procedure originating
with Congress rather than the one arising out of a call of two-thirds of states.
James Wilson set this tone of emphasis early in the ratification debates during
an important public meeting when he concluded: "If there are errors, it should
be remembered, that the seeds of reformation are sown in the work itself, and
the concurrence of two thirds of the congress may at any time introduce
alterations and amendments. 136 Why did Wilson not mention the second
amendment procedure? After all, it was intended to reassure states that they
could act to improve the new system without the assent of Congress. Because
the number of states needed to ratify the Constitution and to call for
amendments was the same, the specter of nine states attempting to ratify and
call for specific amendments at that same time did not bode well. Consider
George Washington's description of the problems encountered with
amendments desired contemporaneous with the ratification of the
Constitution itself:
That the proposed Constitution will admit of amendments is
acknowledged by its warmest advocates but to make such
amendments as may be proposed by the several States the condition
of its adoption would, in my opinion amount to a compleat rejection
of it; for upon examination of the objections which are made by the
opponents in different States and the amendments which have been
proposed it will be found that what would be a favourite object with
one State is the very thing which is strenuously opposed by another
137

In addition to the desire to avoid a second constitutional convention, these
supporters of the Constitution worried that the multiplicitous and conflicting

framing a general Government for these States, and how little propositions in
themselves so opposite to each other, will tend to promote that desirable an end, can
wish to make amendments the ultimatum for adopting the offered system."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 85, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("the system,
though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best
that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit").
135

THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

136 James Wilson's Speech at a Public Meeting, in 1 DEBATE, at 69. Note that this speech
soon became one of the most widely reprinted defenses of the new Constitution,
appearing in newspapers throughout the states, and marked Wilson as its leading public
advocate." ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS & DEBATES, supra note 120, at 183.
137

Letter of George Washington to John Armstrong, in 2
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natures of the calls for amendments would pose an intractable problem that
138
the second procedure of Article V was intended to remedy.
By providing that Congress call a constitutional convention upon a call by
the states, the Framers hoped to avoid multiple competing amendments on the
same topic, each getting the assent of several, but not the requisite
three-quarters of states. 139 Before the United States Congress could ensure such
a consolidated focus, the Constitution would have to be ratified. Thus, the
supporters adopted the position that states needed to accept the Constitution
pro tanto, despite the fact that the same number would compel a convention for
purposes of amendment once the new government existed.1 40 Essentially, no
power to amend the Constitution existed before the Constitution's initial
ratification. Once ratified, the procedure requiring calls by the states for a
constitutional amendment was never reinvigorated.
Further contributing to this lack of interest in the second procedure was the
fact that Congress indeed proved to be the most efficient way to generate
amendments when it quickly proposed twelve amendments as Bill of Rights. 141
Since then, Congress has generated every proposed amendment that has been
submitted to the states for ratification. In the few instances in which calls for a
particular amendment have come close to the requisite two-thirds of states,
Congress has acted to propose the amendment rather than allow a special
convention to take over the opportunity to debate and draft a proposal. 142 In
light of Congress's ability to avert a called convention, a number of scholars
now declare the second procedure to be almost irrelevant. 143 Whatever the
merits of such an assertion, this latter procedure has remained unfruitful for

13 8

See infra Part II.B.4.

139

See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 525-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
140

See Charles Jarvis on the Amendment Procedure: An Irrefutable Argument for
Ratification (Jan. 30,1788), in 1 DEBATE, at 918 (arguing that Constitution "may admit of
measures being taken, in any moment after it is adopted") (emphasis added); Charles
Jarvis Supports John Hancock's Strategy on Amendments (Feb. 4, 1788), in I DEBATE, at
935 ("[A] conditional amendment must operate as a total rejection.")
141

See ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 9

(1978); see also I DEBATE, at 1100-01 (chronicling events of 1789).
142
The Seventeenth Amendment was one such instance. See Kobach, supra note 87, at
1978-79.
143See, e.g., id. at 1973 (characterizing process of seeking constitutional convention by
call of states as "hopeless quest"); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, in RESPONDING To IMPERFECTION, supra note 8, at 237,257,265 (concluding
that "the U.S. Constitution is unusually, and probably excessively, difficult to amend"
especially with respect to the second method of amendment).
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purposes of amendment. 144 Nonetheless, it too shows the elements that the
Framers thought essential for constitutional amendment procedures.
B. The Essential Elements of Article V's Amendment Procedures
1. Congress or the State Legislatures, Rather Than Citizens, Act to Originate
Amendments
Although Professor Amar contends that citizens themselves may act to
amend the Constitution, neither Article V nor the ratification debates
acknowledge this as an option. Time and again, the two methods for
originating the amendments were acknowledged to be exclusive-especially
by Anti-Federalists who would have liked that amendments come by a call of
the people. Consider famous Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry's lament in the
Virginia ratifying convention:
The way to amendment, is, in my conception, shut.... Let us suppose
...that you happen to deal these powers to unworthy hands; will they
relinquish powers already in their possession, or, agree to
amendments? Two thirds of the Congress, or, of the State Legislatures,are
14 5
necessary even to propose amendments.
Professor Amar, however, contends that the Framers understood that a
majority of citizens could always amend their form of government, and that
this understanding was so basic as to be unnecessary to articulate.146 He asserts
that "majority rule popular sovereignty outside Article V' entails a "national
majority rather than some constellation of state majorities." 147
In particular, he relies on James Wilson's statements during the ratification
debates that affirmed the democratic nature of the new government.1 48
Professor Amar contends that Wilson took for granted the idea that a majority
of citizens may alter or abolish the Constitution at any time. In contrast, Amar
rejects Madison's "path" of requiring states to ratify as incompatible with true
popular sovereignty, "the central meaning of republican government."149 He
also notes another putative version of popular sovereignty in Jefferson Davis'
declaration that majorities within an individual state have the right to veto
federal authority by state secession. Because "Davis was wrong," Professor
144

Unless, of course, Congress can be spurred to activity when state calls for a
convention approach the requisite two-thirds. See Van Alstyne, supra note 87, at 943
(suggesting this to have been the case with Seventeenth Amendment).
145Patrick Henry's Speech before Virginia Ratifying Convention, in ANTI-FEDERALIST
PAPERS & DEBATES, supra note 120, at 203-04 (emphasis added); see also "An Old Whig,"
in 1 DEBATE, at 122-23.
146

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 474-84.

147

ld. at 506-07.

14 8

1d. at 474-75.

49

1 1d. at 507; Amar, Central Meaning, supra note 52, at 749.
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Amar reasons that "Wilson must be right."150 This syllogistic reasoning,
however, is weak and ignores the circumstances that the Framers considered
in the Philadelphia convention that would make this reading of Wilson's
position highly implausible.
The path of Davis does not stand for a single-state veto of constitutional
amendments, but for something entirely different. It represents a veto power
over federal authority in the form of secession by resolution of the majority
within a state. Professor Amar acknowledges that states do not have the same
power over the central government as they did under the Articles of
Confederation even though he asserts that action at the state level should be
by simple majority of the electorate. The path of Davis is inapposite to the
amendment process because it is the path to disintegration, not improvements
15 1
to the union.
The path of Madison, however, is apposite to constitutional amendment. To
assert that such a conception of the power of popular amendment is
inconsistent with the "fundamental principle of republican government" that
"the majority should rule"152 is to suggest that the Framers somehow got it
wrong, and their government was not "republican" because it was also
federal.1 53 Perhaps this may seem insufficiently republican to some. But it is
erroneous to assume that it is beyond argument that such a federal/democratic
mixture is incompatible with the political theory of the Framers and the
Constitution that they adopted. Nonetheless, Professor Amar adheres to a
reading of Wilson as understanding that the Constitution itself admits of direct
democratic action by citizens themselves.
Professor Amar's popular amendment proposal could hardly have been
"understood and self-consciously acted upon" by the ratifying conventions of
the southern states that were anxious to protect slavery. 154 For it would have
permitted the more populous free states to have accomplished exactly what
Article V forbade-a national petition for a national convention for the national
abolition of slavery upon the national ratification of a constitutional amend-

150

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 507.

151

The right of secession is properly denied-once a state ratified the Constitution
under Article VII-it was bound by the Constitution, like it or not-but the arguments
for ratification were premised importantly on the protection of state autonomy
promised by the state-by-state three-quarter supermajority ratification process for
amendments, overlaid by the veto power of any state over the diminishment of its equal
suffrage in the Senate.
152

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 507.

153

The federal government has never been a strict "majority rule" government, and
the only enduring express substantive limitation on the power of amendment-the
preservation of equal suffrage of every state in the Senate-powerfully underscores that
fact.
154

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 495.
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ment to that effect. 155 Yet, the Framers took pains to note that no proposal had
even been suggested in the Philadelphia convention that would have resulted
in two separate unions. 156
This is not to say that Wilson would not have desired a majority rule of
citizens of the whole of the United States or that this majority would eradicate
slavery from the nation; he clearly would have relished this.157 But as a matter
of forming a just republic in a world of vices, he understood-as did the other
Philadelphia convention delegates-that the southern states would not join a
union whereby the more populous north could so easily trump them and
abolish slavery.158 Wilson was no stranger to realpolitik, and must have
understood that the union could be founded upon a provision that would be
an anathema to several states. 159
Furthermore, the denial of equal suffrage in the Senate would also be fair
game under Professor Amar's proposal. Again, it would have been extremely
unlikely that the smaller states would have agreed to join a union when their
status would have been so tenuous. 160 Remember that when the Delaware
legislature appointed its representatives to the Philadelphia convention, it
instructed them not to agree to any changes that would deny their state's equal
representation. 161 During the convention, delegates of the smaller states
reminded their peers of the need for preservation of this equal
representation. 162 Again, Wilson understood the necessity of this protection in
Article V if the union would have a chance at securing all thirteen states. 163

15 5

The southern states were very aware of the population demographics that favored
the north. See, e.g., C.C. Pinckney: Speech in South Carolina House of Representatives,
in 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 253 (stating populations of each state including three-fifths
calculation of slaves for representation purposes).
156Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in DEBATE, at 193.
157 James Wilson on the Slave Trade Clause (Dec. 3, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 829-30.
1581 id. Wilson no doubt understood and shared Madison's perception that "S.
Carolina & Georgia were inflexible on the point of slaves." Letter from James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 202. Yet, because Professor Amar
denies that Article V's constraints apply to the people, the provision that forbade
eradication of the slave trade prior to 1808 would not have been binding on such a
democratic movement for constitutional amendment. Clearly, this would not have
gotten by South Carolina and Georgia.
15 9

See General William Heath on Slavery (Jan. 30, 1788), in 1 DEBATE, at 916 ("[T]he
slavery of our fellow men, a restriction ... laid on the federal government, which could
not be avoided and a union taken place: The federal Convention went as far as they
could, the migration or importation, &c. is confined to the States now existing only, new
States cannot claim it.").
160
See VILE, supra note 97, at 128 (characterizing Article V substantive constraints as
"essential to pacifying small states and those with slaves").

1611 DEBATE, at 1076.
1621 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 37 (May 30); 1 id. at 178 (June 9).
1631 id. at 179 (recounting that delegates had understood Mr. Wilson's "hint" that the
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2. State Legislatures or Special Conventions-Rather Than
Citizens-Must Ratify
Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed that the Constitution required
three-quarters of states to ratify any constitutional amendment, though they
disagreed on the wisdom of this scheme. 164 Just as with the first element of
amendment, this requirement ensured that the more populous northern states
could not ride roughshod over the more agrarian southern states. Moreover,
the Framers understood that states would not cede all of their powers to the
federal government after serving as the hegemonic unit of government under
the Articles of Confederation. Thus, an aspect of federalism under the new
Constitution would give states a way to protect themselves against usurpations
by the central government. 165 By allowing the state governments to reject
changes to the federal system, their vitality was thus expected to be
166
protected.
But doesn't this violate the democratic principles that James Wilson declared
to be enshrined in the process of amendment under the Constitution?
Ultimately, no. Even with the states being the principle actors under Article V,
the spirit of democracy still exists. Wilson argued that we should judge the
democratic nature of government by the nature of its relation to the people.
Wilson identified several sources of authority antithetical to democracy.
For it is not any part of the British constitution, as practised at this time,
that the king derives his authority from the people. Formerly that
authority was claimed by hereditary or divine right; and even at the
revolution, when the government was essentially improved, no other
of an original contract between the
principle was recognized, but16that
7
sovereign and the people ....

small states would refuse to join government in which their position would be tenuous).
164

See, e.g., Speech of Patrick Henry (June 5, 1788), in ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS &

DEBATES, supra note 120, at 204 ("A bare majority in these four small States may hinder

");
"An Old Whig," in 1 DEBATE, at 123-24.
the adoption of amendments ....
165

See generally Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and
the Roleofthe Supreme Court in Defending Federalism,10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189 (1987).
166

Article V's reliance on states-rather than citizens-parallels Article I, section 3's
reliance on states to select senators. Both measures were seen as guarantees that states
would have the power to check the central government. See id. at 191-96. As already
noted, a constitutional amendment complying with Article V's requirements was
required to change the allocation of power within the federal system. Similarly, Article
V's balance of federalism between the states and federal government may not simply
be ignored under the rubric of popular sovereignty.
16 7 James Wilson's Opening Address in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, in 1
DEBATE, at 795 (emphasis added).
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Authority deriving from other sources was antithetical to the new republican
government because it would deny the political agency of the people in favor
of some reified, external authority or physical coercion. 168 Wilson
acknowledged that government could be democratic in nature without having
to involve every citizen in every decision so long as authority ultimately
derived from the consent of the governed. In fact, he thought the "idea of
representation" to be "essential to every system of wise, good, and efficient
169
government."
Wilson had no doubt that government under the Constitution would
preserve the right of the people to exercise their political agency because all
governmental action would be taken by officials chosen by election, rather than
force, heredity, divine right, or social contract. A government in which no
representative may rise to and remain in power except by electorate approval
must be republican, and sufficiently democratic in nature.
A free government has often been compared to a pyramid. This
allusion is made with peculiar propriety in the system before you; it is
laid on the broad basis of the people, while they are confined, in
proportion as they ascend, until they end in that most permanent of
all forms. When you examine all its parts, they will invariably be found
to preserve that essential
mark of free governments--a chain of
170
connection with the people.
Because the people serve as the only constant in republican
government-nothing essential inheres in the form or continued existence of
the federal or state governments-Wilson did not consider federal principles
to be incompatible with the popular nature of the Constitution. Thus, requiring
state legislatures or special conventions to act in amending the Constitution
did not abrogate the political rights of citizens in their individual capacities.
3. Super Majorities-Not Simple Majorities-Must Act to Amend
That republican government derives its authority from the consent of the
governed for its authority does not, as a corollary, require that a bare majority
of citizens have the prerogative to amend the Constitution. Instead, the

168

1n addition to such abstract authorities, Wilson noted additional methods by which

government has denied the political agency of the governed. "The greatest part of
government have been founded on conquest; perhaps a few early ones may have had
their origin in paternal authority." James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec.
11, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 836. Wilson was not alone in this thinking. See, e.g., "A Citizen
of America" [Noah Webster] (Oct. 17,1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 154-55 (juxtaposing military
force, monarchy, paternal authority, and religion against authority derived from
democracy).
169Wilson's Opening Address, in I DEBATE, at 795.
170James Wilson's Summation & Final Rebuttal in the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, in 1 DEBATE, at 863 (emphasis added).
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supermajority requirement ensures sufficient popular support to justify
working a new mandate into the fundament of government.
During the convention's consideration of the amendment process, James
Wilson initially suggested a two-thirds requirement. 17 1 Seemingly without
hesitation, he then proposed a higher figure (three-quarters) upon the defeat
of his initial suggestion. 172 The convention adopted the three-quarters
requisite, which met with approval by the Constitutions supporters during
ratification. 173 Although this requisite met with consternation from a number
of leading Anti-Federalists, none seem to have disputed the existence of the
supermajority requirement.
The conditions, I say, upon which any alterations can take place,
appear to me to be such as never will exist two thirds of both houses
of Congress or the legislatures of two thirds of the states must agree in
desiring a convention to be called. This will probably never happen;
but if it should happen, then the convention may agree to the
after all, three fourths of
amendments or not as they think right;17 and
4
the states must ratify the amendments.
In short, simple majorities of states or citizens simply do not suffice to amend
the Constitution.
Professor Amar, however, argues against this conclusion even while
justifying the legality of the Constitution's initial ratification by fewer states
175
He
than the unanimity required under the Articles of Confederation.
searches for a way to defend this initial exclusive method of ratifying the
Constitution by a supermajority of states while adhering to his thesis that the
same method cannot now be required to amend the same document. His ploy
is to justify the initial ratification on the basis that it required majoritarian action
within the states.
Thus, the key voting rule in Article VII is simple majority rule, and not
supermajority rule, as might be inferred from a too casual glance at its
seeming 9/13 voting rule.... The true voting rule occurs within each
The 9/13
state, where a simple majority did bind dissenters ....
provision is thus best understood as a substantive condition
.. so that the new scheme could achieve a workable
subsequent .1 76
critical mass.

17 1 Cf. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 557-59.
1722 id. at 558-59.
173

Governor Edmund Randolph Explains Why He Now Supports the Constitution
with Amendments, in 2 DEBATE, at 603.
174

"An Old Whig," in I

17 5

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 462-69 (defending the Constitution's legality

DEBATE, at 123.

vis-a-vis the Articles of Confederation).
17 6

1d. at 487 n.112.
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But Professor Amar cannot have it both ways. If popular sovereignty always
inheres in people whatever the unit of sovereignty may be 177 a mere majority
of citizens acting in their individual capacities could have adopted the
Constitution. There is nothing about the sovereign nature of the states that
Amar's theorem would admit as precluding this result.
Even if there were something "essential" about simple majority rule at the
local level, 178 this does not deny the propriety of requiring a supermajority to
facilitate constitutional amendments. Amar does not explain why the
supermajority requirement should not continue to ensure a continuing
"workable critical mass" of support for a particular amendment to the extant
Constitution. Ultimately, the clearest and most satisfying account of Article
VII's initial ratification requirements is that the people were constrained to act
then, as today, in their representative forms of state legislatures or conventions,
and by supermajority.
Professor Amar, however, fears that if more than a simple majority is
required there seems to be no principled basis for establishing another, higher
requisite number. 179 Perhaps there is no principle that establishes another
magic fraction. But this does not prove that a simple majority suffices to amend
the Constitution. Simple majority rule represents the smallest number that may
democratically bind the greatest number of dissenters. Such a thin advantage
is inappropriate to secure the "critical mass" of acceptance of a new
constitutional scheme.
4. Congress Must be Involved
The involvement of Congress constitutes the final element that is common
to both of Article V's amendment procedures. Congress either drafts the
amendment itself or convenes a special convention for that purpose. That
Congress is integral to the process is a sign of the need for focus in originating
constitutional amendments. Hamilton noted that the involvement of Congress
serves to ensure that only one amendment on a particular issue pend
ratification, rather than having a myriad of competing, and possibly
conflicting, versions of an amendment on a particular subject, the involvement
of Congress serves to ensure that only one amendment on an issue pend
ratification. Thus, he urged support of Article V because "every amendment to
the Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might
177
1d. at 489 ("To be sure, the Constitution redefined the relevant polity, but that
redefinition cannot change the basic nature of popular sovereignty.").
178

Note that Amar argues that state constitutions that require more than a majority
of citizens to amend violate the spirit of republican government. See id. at 484. By this
token, most states today would have unrepublican charters.
179

Professor Amar asserts that "simple majority rule has unique mathematical
properties. It is the only workable rule that treats all voters and all policy proposals
equally. Once majority rule is abandoned, there is no logical stopping point between
say 50% plus two rule, and a 99.9% rule. And the latter of course is not ruleby the people."
Id. at 503.
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be brought forward singly."'180 The danger inhering in a lack of focus is that
enough states may ratify substantially similar amendments on a topic to show
that three-quarters desire a particular change-but no single proposal receive
the requisite number and each version differing in important details. Happily,
Article V has proven effective in averting this problem.
C. ProfessorAmar's Procedurenot Providedfor in Article V
Professor Amar recognizes the necessity of this fourth element of
amendment procedure and incorporates it in his proposal for popular
constitutional change. His proposal involves Congress calling a special
convention-just like that required by Article V's second procedure-to
propose an amendment. Professor Amar's proposal, however, dispenses with
the other three elements. Amar summarizes by stating "that Congress would be
obliged to call a convention to propose revisions if a majority of American voters
so petition; and that an amendment or new Constitution could be lawfully
ratified by a simple majority of the American electorate.' 181 Thus, he seemingly
folds his idea of popular amendment back into the convention procedure of
Article V by incorporating the idea of Congress as the convening body.182 This
18

0THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
That the Framers correctly anticipated the problems involved with competing,
unfocused calls for amendment was demonstrated by the debates over the ratification
of the Constitution. In fact, every state ratifying after Massachusetts followed that state's
example by adopting a list of recommended amendments. BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supranote
37, at 23-24. A number of these proclamations, however, conflicted. See The Ratifications
and Resolutions of Seven State Conventions (adopted Feb. 6-Aug. 2,1788, printed early
Sept. 1788), in 2 DEBATE, at 536-74. And thus it would have been chaotic to circulate
competing measures for each state to consider.
181 Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 459.
182

1d. In essence, Professor Amar's proposal reintroduces the idea that citizens may

give binding instructions to their governmental representatives on matters of
constitutional importance. This idea is not new. Instead, it occupied the minds of many
Americans during the period after Independence and before the adoption of the United
States Constitution. "[Slome Americans had come to believe that it was precisely on
these 'great and leading questions' of public policy, such as the formation of
governments or the disestablishment of religion, rather than on more parochial
questions, that binding instructions were most necessary." WOOD, supra note 61, at 191.
The theory behind the power of the people to instruct their representatives rests on a
narrow conception of delegated political agency.
Petitioning implied that the representative was a superior so completely
possessed of the full authority of all the people that he must be solicited,
never commanded, by his particular electors and must speak only for
the general good and not merely for the interests of his local constituents.
Instructing, on the other hand, implied that the delegate represented no
one but the people who elected him and that he was simply a mistrusted
agent of his electors, bound to follow their directions.
Id. at 189. Interestingly, the First Amendment states that the people may "petition the
government for redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (emphasis added). And,
indeed the Preamble affirms that the Constitution was established in part to form a more
perfect union, general welfare, and common defense. Yet, this alone begs the question
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is a surprising move in light of his view that Amar seems to consider the
convention process simply as an alternative governmental means of amending
183
the Constitution.
But his proposal seems to accept that Article V provides the means for
implementing direct amendment through its national conventions process,
with the popular process differing from the governmental process in that a
national referendum rather than state legislative application would require
Congress to convene a national constitutional convention. 184 He thus enlists
the Article V national convention process as the means, but rejects the Article V
state convention process as inconsistent with government respecting the
consent of the governed. Thus he would permit ratification by national
referendum so that majority rule would not be frustrated by a minority of
voters nationwide who might constitute a majority of the voters of one-quarter
of the states plus one.
1. The Wished-For Ideal: The Popular Element in Constitutional
Amendment Process
While Professor Amar's proposal would have been impracticable at the time
of the founding-both as a matter of getting all thirteen states to join the union
and the impossibility of orchestrating a national referendum over so large a
territory-certainly a number of the founding generation would have liked to
have obtained closer connection of the federal government to the people. James
Wilson, in particular, articulated such a desire.
If it could be effected all the people of the same society ought to meet
in one place, and communicate freely with each other on the great
business of representation. Though this is cannot be done in fact, yet
we find that it is the most favorite and constitutional idea. It is
supported by this principle too, that every member185
is a representative
of the whole community and not a particular part.

of whether the Constitution admits of instructions on matters of amendments.
This issue ultimately turns on whether the power to instruct may be denied without
undermining the democratic elements of our republican government. Can we claim to
be democratic if we retain only the power to petition for redress of our grievances within
the rules of our Constitution? (The power to abolish the Constitution entirely when it no
longer enjoys the consent of the governed being a distinctly different question.)
Ultimately, yes insofar as the power to instruct is tempered to disallow the majority
from undermining its own authority or denying the fundamental rights of others. Cf.
generally Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 504-05 nn.170-71.
183

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 459.

84

1 Perhaps Professor Amar would deem allowable a national referendum that
attempted to constitute a national convention independently of one called by Congress,
but he does not commit himself to this point.
18 5 James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal in the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, in 1 DEBATE, at 846.
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Perhaps the changed circumstances of modem technology and the result of the
Civil War Amendments may allow for a greater element of popular sovereignty
in the constitutional amendment process than would have been possible in
1789.186 Modernly, calls for greater popular governmental determinations have
been fostered by continuing advances in technology. Consider the following
rumination, drawn from a recent issue of The Economist:
When the public view can be tested so easily, another question arises:
why have elected representatives at all? If individual voters can pose
questions and offer views, will representative democracy prove to be
merely a 200-year intermediate technology, a bridge between the direct
Greece and the electronic voting of modern
ancient
voting of 18
7
California?
Although this idea is provocative, any "improvement" to the constitutional
amendment process that incorporates greater elements of popular sovereignty
cannot entirely forego federal elements that characterize our republican
system. While technology and civil rights improvements advance, federalism
has not yet become obsolete. Tyranny of the majority that arises from
"temporary inclinations," fears and prejudices can oppress more efficiently and
on a greater scale than before.1 88 Federalism has become more important than
ever in checking tyranny of the majority in an age when citizens absorb
instantaneous, nation-wide, media coverage. Thus, if popular sovereignty is to
be incorporated into the amendment process to a greater extent, it must be done
so with a wary eye toward heeding Madison's Federalist caveats and federal
solution.
D. Amar's Theorem Reconstructed
Federalism and popular sovereignty are not mutually exclusive. Professor
Amar's theorem does not necessarily entail the once unthinkable proposition
that every state was at the mercy of the national population's desire to amend
the Constitution. Suppose instead we reconstruct Amar's theorem in the
following fashion: Article V's provision for Congress to convene a national

186

Amar, Consent, supra note 7, at 502-03 ("Today, because of vast improvements in
communication and transportation technology-radio, television, cable, fiber-optics,
electronic town meetings, etc.-there may be ways to retain the deliberation of the
convention while providing for even more direct popular participation, akin to
referenda.").
187 Democracy and Technology: e-lectioneering, THE ECONOMIST, June 17, 1995, at 23; see
also The Future of Democracy, THE ECONOMIST, June 17, 1995, at 14 ("If democrats have

spent much of the century telling fascists and communists that they ought to trust the
people, can democrats now tell the people themselves that this trust operates only once
every few years?").
188
Even Jefferson noted the problems of instability and ill-considered changes to be
avoided even though "the will of the Majority should always prevail." Letter of Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, at 213.
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constitutional convention upon the demand of a two-thirds vote in both
houses, or upon a demand of two-thirds of the legislatures of the states, is not
exclusive of a national convention called by Congress upon petition of a
majority of the national electorate. But the amendments (or new Constitution)
proposed by such a national convention, whether governmentally or popularly
ordained, must still be ratified by "one or the other Mode of Ratification" as
proposed by Congress and provided under Article V.
This is, of course, just "half a loaf' of true popular sovereignty majority rule
on a national basis. But it gives effect to virtually all of Amar's arguments of
reserved popular sovereignty to demand amendments that might reconstitute
the governmental structure of the United States in ways that the existing
governmental structure might resist, if it were exclusively in control of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, without abandoning the reserved
federal powers of individual states to protect their welfare as states absent a
supermajority of support for the amendment by sister states.
IV.CONCLUSION

The Preamble stands at the head of the Constitution to remind us that our
Constitution was established in order to create a more perfect union. This
means that the majority cannot simply do as it pleases, even in a democracy.
We must remember that the Constitution rightly places certain fundamental
principles above majoritarian right, such as the need to ensure justice for even
the minority, due process for unpopular individuals, and a focus on the whole,
not just a half plus one. Properly read, the Constitution relies on majoritarian
action as the engine that moves us toward a more perfect union. But the
Constitution also prohibits that impetus to amend the Constitution unchecked.
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